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In the beginning, arbitration was straightforward. Once a dispute
had arisen, the parties agreed to submit it for resolution to a third party.
The courts stayed out of the process. They did not even enforce the
agreement to arbitrate. But they did enforce the arbitrator's decision.'
* Stanley H. Fuld Professor of Law, Columbia University, Editor-in-Chief, The
American Review of International Arbitration. The views expressed in this article are the
author's only. The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance provided by
Neel Maitra, Class of 2009 Columbia Law School. Copyright by the author.
1. On the status of the law prior to the adoption of the state and federal arbitration
laws, see Alan S. Rau, Fear of Freedom, 17 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 469, 488 at n.60
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The next step was to enforce the agreement to arbitrate. The courts
were not enthusiastic about enforcing a substitute for their exclusive
prerogative. The legislature had to push it, one might say, down their
throats.2
And then the Supreme Court went even further and ruled that, if the
arbitration agreement so provided, the arbitrators were the ones to
determine whether the dispute was arbitrable.3
This development of the legislative form of arbitration became more
than matched by those using the process. And as the popularity of
arbitration has grown, so has the inventiveness of its users to adopt it to
their purposes. Since arbitration is a creation of contract, the general
perception that the freedom to contract created limitless opportunities for
adapting arbitration to the contracting parties' purposes gained general
ground. And thus the many modifications of the arbitral process that
have emerged in recent times were introduced in contemporary
arbitration practice.
In the following, I will address a number of these modifications
without any claim to completeness. Their permissibility remains largely
unsettled. It is only recently that the Supreme Court ruled impermissible
contractual expansion of judicial review of arbitral award. 4 But the fate
of many other modifications still awaits final judicial adjudication. 5 I
will here address some of the more prominent ones without making any
claim to completeness.
Contractual modifications of arbitration as we know it include the
following: modification of the scope of review of arbitral awards;
modification of the bilateral character of arbitration by granting the
option to arbitrate to only one of the parties; modification of the
composition of the tribunal; modification of the arbitral procedure by
excluding procedures such as class actions; and modification of the
applicable law by excluding punitive or consequential damages.
(2006), contradicting assertions by Justice Stevens in Hall Street Associates v. Mattel,
Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396 at 1409 n.3 (2008) and by Tom Cullinan in Contracting for an
Expanded Scope of Judicial Review in Arbitration Agreements, 51 VAND. L. REv. 395,
409 (1998).
2. The state and federal statutes provide for enforcement of both agreements to
arbitrate present and agreements to arbitrate future disputes. See 9 U.S.C. 2 (1925) and
the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, §6(a) (2000).
3. In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 US 395 (1967), the
Supreme Court ruled that, when the arbitration agreement so provided, the issue of
whether the arbitrator had jurisdiction was for the arbitrator.
4. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008).
5. Thus far, the U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled on the legal status of any of the
forms of contractual modification here discussed.
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I. CONTRACTUAL MODIFICATION OF REVIEW OF ARBITRAL AWARDS
A. Contractual Expansion of Judicial Review
Arbitration is essentially a one-stage process. Everything is
adjudicated in a single instance. There are only two means of obtaining
judicial review of an arbitral award. Annulment can be sought under the
law of the place or law of arbitration.6 And the award may be denied
recognition and enforcement under the provisions of the New York
Convention.7 The means for attack on an award under either procedure
are most limited.8 Specifically, arbitral errors in making determinations
6. The New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral
Awards [hereafter N.Y. Convention], under Article V(1)(e), permits for annulment of
awards at the place of arbitration or under the law of the country in which the arbitration
is conducted or under the law of which the award has been made. On this provision, see
Hans Smit, Annulment and Recognition ofAnnulled Awards, 18 AM. REv. INT'L ARB. 297
(2007). Postscript at 309 of the same issue.
7. The New York Convention provides in Art. 5(l)(e) that an annulled award may
be refused recognition. On this provision, see Smit, H., note 6 supra.
8. The grounds for non-recognition or enforcement are limited and stated in Art.
V(1) and (2) of the N.Y. Convention, which reads as follows:
Article V
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of
the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the
competent authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof
that:
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under the
law applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is
not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing
any indication thereon, under the law of the country where the award was
made; or
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper
notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings
or was otherwise unable to present his case; or
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling
within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions
on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided
that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated
from those not so submitted, that part of the award which contains
decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be recognized and
enforced; or
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was
not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such
agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country where the
arbitration took place; or
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set
aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or
under the law of which, that award was made.
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the
competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is
sought finds that:
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of fact or law are not reviewable. The limited review available under
prevailing law has created tensions, especially in cases in which the
errors committed by the arbitral tribunal appeared to be obvious. This
had led lower courts to seize upon a remark by Justice Reed in Wilko v.
Swan that an award might be reviewed for manifest disregard of the law.
9
That remark had no bearing on the final disposition of the case, but no
attention was paid to the fact that the award was obiter dictum and was
interjected in a case in which the law potentially disregarded was of a
mandatory nature.10 And the attacks upon arbitral awards based on
alleged manifest disregard of the law increasingly filled the pages of
reported court cases and the law reviews.1 '
More sophisticated courts have tried to suppress the urge to run to
court when the award turned out to be unsatisfactory by ruling that
manifest disregard was present only when the arbitrators knew what the
law was, but deliberately disregarded it,' 2 but even the Second Circuit,
which had formulated this very narrow ground, has not applied it
consistently.' 3 It properly did not apply it when the law disregarded was
of a mandatory nature and in that case properly also paid little attention
to the requirement that the disregard be manifest. But some courts,
including the First Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court,
vacated arbitral awards even for manifest disregard of the contract. 14
Indeed, it is rather surprising that a dictum without any statutory
foundation, pulled, as it were, out of the air by a Justice who had no need
for it, had such a long life. Perhaps appropriately, it was recently dealt
what may well be a death blow by another Justice of the Supreme Court,
who, again superfluously, questioned its legal existence in a case in
which contractual expansion of judicial review of an arbitral award was
ruled impermissible. I had argued earlier, rather emphatically, that the
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by
arbitration under the law of that country; or
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the
public policy of that country.
9. 346 U.S. 427, 437 (1953).
10. The applicable statute was The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77a (1933).
11. For law review treatments of the doctrine, see Hans Smit, Manifest Disregard of
the Law in the First Department of the Appellate Division, 15 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 11l
(2004); Hans Smit, Manifest Disregard of the Law in New York Court of Appeals, 15 AM.
REV. INT'L ARB. 315 (2004); Hans Smit, Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.: A
Critical Comment, 17 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 513 (2006); Christopher Drahozal, Codifying
Manifest Disregard, 8 NEV. L.J. 234 (2007).
12. Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 1988).
13. See Halligan, 148 F.3d 197; Hans Smit, Is Manifest Disregard Of The Law Or
The Evidence Or Both A Ground For Vacatur Of An Arbitral Award?, 8 AM. REV. INT'L
ARB. 341 (1997).
14. See authorities cited in note II supra.
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doctrine had no proper legal footing, but the courts had continued to
apply the doctrine until Justice Souter, in Hall Street Associates v.
Mattel, Inc. questioned its validity. 15 At the present time, the doctrine is
probably dead or awaiting a proper internment.
The burial of the doctrine, although not in case of disregard of
mandatory law, has only increased the desire to obtain review of arbitral
awards not subject to attack in an annulment or denial of confirmation
proceeding.
One way of obtaining review of an otherwise final arbitral award
was by contractual expansion of the statutorily provided grounds of
review. Provisions used for that purpose often provided that the award to
be rendered could be reviewed on the grounds available in a federal
appeals court for review of district court decisions.16  The Supreme
Court's decision in the Mattel case put an end to such expansions.
7
Thus, the Mattel case put an end to both contractual expansion of judicial
review and manifest disregard of the law as devices for obtaining judicial
review of arbitral awards on non-statutory grounds. No wonder the bar
started to look with renewed vigor for other means of reviewing arbitral
awards. Intra-arbitral review appears to be the new favorite. It will be
addressed below.
B. Contractual Restriction of Judicial Review
Parties to an arbitration agreement have not only attempted to
expand judicial review of arbitral awards, they have also provided for its
restriction or elimination altogether. Some countries like Switzerland
and Belgium, explicitly permit this provided neither of the parties is a
national.18  In the United States, the issue has not been statutorily
addressed.
I have elsewhere argued that it is incompatible with the statutory
regime of arbitration to modify statutorily provided judicial review of
15. For a criticism of Justice Souter's ruling in this regard, see Hans Smit, Hall
Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.: A Critical Comment, supra note 11. The
doctrine was applied, post Mattel, in Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 190 P.3d
586 (Cal. 2008). The fact that the law to which Justice Reed referred in Wilko v. Swan
was of a mandatory nature has generally been overlooked. In the Mitsubishi case, in
which the Court noted that an erroneous ruling by the arbitral tribunal was subject to a
"second look" in court, the applicable antitrust law was also of a mandatory nature. 473
U.S. 614 (1985).
16. A contractual provision to that effect was the subject of the Mattel case. Hall St.
Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008).
17. See Hans Smit, Contractual Modification of the Scope of Judicial Review of
Arbitral Awards, 8 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 147 (1997).
18. See the statutes cited in BORN, G., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION:
COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 765 (2001).
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arbitral award, whether by expanding or restricting it,19 but Justice
Souter, in the Mattel case, rejected, although improperly, the notion that
contractual modification of judicial review would affect the court's
subject matter jurisdiction.2 °  In both my prior and subsequent
publications I have defended the view that the scope of judicial review
prescribed by law raises an issue of subject matter adjudicatory authority,
which, under established principles, cannot be modified by contractual
21arrangements. Under that view, the scope of judicial review of arbitral
awards can be neither expanded nor reduced. A provision in an
arbitration agreement providing for reduced judicial review is therefore,
in my view, invalid and not enforceable. Acceptance of this view raises
the question of whether an arbitration clause providing for such review
would be enforced as if it contained no such provision or whether its
22partial invalidity would invalidate the entire clause. An agreement
providing for enhanced judicial review would probably be enforced as
providing for arbitration with the normal statutorily prescribed judicial
review on the theory that the parties that wanted expanded review would
have consented to the review they could receive rather than not arbitrate
at all. The same assumption is not necessarily warranted when judicial
review is contractually reduced or precluded, since the parties might well
have preferred no arbitration rather than arbitration plus any judicial
review. Nevertheless, in the case of both types of clauses, I would argue
that the strong statutory endorsement of arbitration should decide the
issue on favor of arbitration with the statutory form of judicial review.
C. Intra-Arbitral Review
1. Introduction
The limited judicial review of arbitral awards statutorily available
has stimulated the search for other methods of review. The recent death
blow administered to the judicially created review for manifest disregard
of the law has only further stimulated this search. As recourse to
19. For a more detailed criticism, see Hans Smit, Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v.
Mattel, Inc.: A Critical Comment, supra note 11.
20. See id.; Hans Smit, Contractual Modification of the Scope of Judicial Review of
Arbitral Awards, supra note 17.
21. The courts appear to agree. The ICC International Arbitration Rules provide, in
Article 28(6), that the parties agree that an award rendered pursuant to those rules shall be
final and conclusive, but the parties and the courts have generally failed to seek to
enforce it. See also Hans Smit, Contractual Modification of the Scope of Judicial Review
ofArbitral Awards, supra note 17.
22. The effect of the invalidity of such a provision on the remainder of the
arbitration clause has also escaped attention.
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arbitration hasgrown, so has the possibility that arbitrators erred in their
assessment of the facts and the law. But any such errors, except for the
now probably defunct review for manifest disregard of the law, remained
beyond the reach of any, whether arbitral or judicial, review. Arbitrators
could not correct errors of facts or law, because the ad hoc and
institutional rules generally limit review by the arbitrators themselves to
"any errors in computation, any clerical or typographical errors, or any
errors of a similar nature,, 23 the description used in the UNCITRAL
Rule, or "clerical, computational or typographical errors, or any errors of
a similar nature," the description found in the Rules of Arbitration of the
International Chamber of Commerce.24 Some courts have given these
terms an elastic interpretation in cases of obvious arbitral mistakes that
did not fit into the narrow borders of the applicable institutional rules,
25
but, generally, these very narrowly defined categories of errors have
precluded review of obvious arbitral errors of fact or law. This has led
potential users to forego arbitration and to opt for recourse to the courts.
Since arbitration is of a consensual nature and owes its existence to
the efforts of those it is designed to serve, attempts are being made to
provide for review of arbitral awards within the bounds of arbitration
itself. These efforts have taken two forms.
2. Review of the Award by the Tribunal Itself
The first is to broaden the scope of review of an arbitral award by
the arbitral tribunal itself by providing in the arbitration agreement in
what circumstances and conditions the tribunal may correct properly
defined errors. In cases in which I have sat as a single arbitrator, I have,
upon occasion, provided for review, going beyond the narrow limits set
by the applicable rules, of both facts and law to be asserted by the parties
within a very short time limit after I disclosed a proposed draft award,
but excluding factual or legal issues that had been argued before the
award was rendered. I can report that this has worked very well and that
this procedure has in some instances led to corrections that could not
have been made under the institutional rules under which the arbitration
was conducted.
Of course, deviation from institutional rules of this nature may
create its own problems, because a party may attack the award on the
23. ICC International Arbitration Rules, Art. 29(1); see also AAA International
Rules Art. 27(1) and Rule 14.6 of the CPR Rules on Non-Administered Arbitration.
24. UNCITRAL Rules, Art. 29.
25. See Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 1988), discussed in
Hans Smit, Is Manifest Disregard Of The Law Or The Evidence Or Both A Ground For
Vacatur Of An Arbitral Award?, supra note 13.
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ground that the arbitrator went beyond the procedural rules the parties
had agreed to be applicable. In the cases in which I followed the
described procedure, I sought and obtained from the parties a stipulation
that they would not attack the award on that ground. If they had refused
that stipulation, I would not have proceeded. And, when there is a three
member tribunal, it may be impossible to obtain agreement to proceed on
that basis. It is therefore desirable to address the problem in the
arbitration agreement itself or, better yet, in the institutional or ad hoc
rules.
It should be noted that the need for new rules for review of arbitral
award is less pressing when the applicable institutional rules provide for
review of the award before it is communicated to the parties. The ICC
International Arbitration Rules provide for such review. However, the
ICC Court may require the arbitrators to modify their award on
procedural issues, but may only recommend changes on substantive
issues. While most arbitrators will give appropriate consequence to
recommendations by the ICC Court, unfortunately my own experience is
that they may not. In any event, even the ICC Court may miss errors that
cannot be rectified under existing rules.
a. Review Provided For in the Arbitration Agreement
At the present time, an obvious way of providing for appropriate
review by the tribunal itself is to provide for such review in the
arbitration agreement. But this may not be an effective way, because the
parties who negotiate an arbitration agreement may not realize that it is
desirable that they do so or because, not knowing which party may
benefit from such review, they do not agree upon providing for it.
Furthermore, a contractual provision for review more extensive than
that provided for in the institutional or ad hoc rules raises a question of
its effectiveness. An agreement to arbitrate under institutional or ad hoc
rules that provide for the usual very limited review is incompatible with a
contractual provision providing for more extensive review. This conflict
will have to be resolved. Will the courts recognize that the arbitral
tribunal is the final adjudicator on this issue or will the institution or the
court finally decide it? That issue may also be contractually addressed,
preferably by giving the tribunal the final authority to determine its own
competence. But what if the institution rules, either explicitly or upon
construction, that its rules prevail over conflicting rules formulated by
the parties? It would therefore appear preferable to address the issue by
amendments in the institutional or ad hoc rules.
1002 [Vol. 113:4
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b. Review Provided For in the Institutional or Ad Hoc Rules
In order to provide for arbitrators' review of their own awards, the
relevant provisions in presently effective institutional and ad hoc rules
awards may be amended to provide for the parties' adopting their own
rules if they so wish. Under such a provision, the presently effective
rules would provide a fall-back provision.
However, for a variety of reasons, parties may not address the issue
at the time of drafting the arbitration agreement. They may not realize at
the time the desirability of doing so or they may be uncertain about what
scope of review will best serve their interests. They may even exclude
any review, which would be socially undesirable.
It would therefore appear preferable for the institutional and ad hoc
rules to provide themselves for the proper scope of review for errors by
the arbitrators themselves. The crucial question would then become
what the scope of that review should be. Proper balancing of the social
interest in promoting final arbitral decisions in a single instance against
the social interest in avoiding errors that may cause injustice would
appear to support a provision for arbitral review of both errors of fact and
law the occurrence of which the parties could not reasonably have
anticipated, and therefore addressed, before making their final
submissions. In particular, they should not have an opportunity to rehash
previously made arguments of law or fact, unless the arbitrators rendered
a decision that could not have been, and was not, anticipated.
If provision for such review is made, most persuasive arguments
could be made for not permitting the parties to deviate from it and to
substitute their own provision. The latter would necessarily raise
questions as to how far this deviation could be permitted without leading
to socially unacceptable results.
However, if review of both unanticipated errors of law and fact by
the tribunal itself is permitted, safeguards against misuse of this
opportunity should be provided. In the first place, the opportunity for
review should be subject to very short time limits with a maximum of at
most thirty days. Second, in order to prevent abuse, the applicant for
such review, and all other parties, should be limited to a single
submission in writing. Third, the opponent may request, and should
normally be granted, security in a sum to be determined by the tribunal to
cover the tribunal's and the opponent's cost in the event the request is
denied and, as the case may be, the relief awarded in the original award.
Fourth, the tribunal must render a decision within at most thirty days
unless it states, in a reasoned written decision before the expiration of
that period, that its proper decision on the request requires an additional
specified period. Fifth, if no decision on the request is rendered within
1003
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the time allowed, the request is deemed denied and any decision out of
time is disregarded and null and void. Sixth, no award is final until a
decision on the request is rendered.
It is submitted that provisions to these effects in the prevailing
institutional and ad hoc rules would go a long way towards meeting the
concerns of those who decide against arbitration on the ground that it is a
one-instance proposition with too high a risk of incorrigible errors.
Nevertheless, this form of expanded review by the tribunal itself cannot
deal with cases of obstinate, arrogant, or incompetent arbitrators. To
deal with them, intra-arbitral review must be performed by a different
tribunal.
3. Review of Arbitral Awards by Appellate Arbitral Tribunals
This form of intra-arbitral review is provided for in the International
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).
However, the scope of ICSID review appears to be unduly limited.26
And the resulting award is not subject to any review in domestic courts.
27
Both limitations, whatever their merits in the context of arbitration of
state-investor disputes, appear inappropriate in the usual form of
commercial arbitration. In commercial arbitration the means of review
allowed in domestic annulment actions and in recognition and
enforcement actions under the New York Convention should remain
available as statutorily prescribed means of review deemed appropriate
by the bodies politic.
28
If it is decided to provide for a second instance intra-arbitral review,
the crucial questions are two: First, how is the appellate tribunal to be
composed; and second, what should be the scope of review?
There appears to be an emergent view that an arbitral appellate
tribunal should be composed of truly neutral arbitrators and should
exclude party-appointed arbitrators. At least I hold that view. The
26. Under Article 52(1) of the ICSID Convention, appeals are limited to the
following grounds:
(a) that the Tribunal was not properly constituted;
(b) that the Tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers;
(c) that there was corruption on the part of a member of the Tribunal;
(d) that there has been a serious departure from a fundamental rule of
procedure; or
(e) that the award has failed to state the reasons on which it is based.
27. Article 52(3) of the ICSID Convention. I have elsewhere argued that, in N.Y.
Convention countries, annulment actions should be limited to grounds specified for non-
recognition in the N.Y. Convention, but, as long as that has not been done, the usual
annulment actions continue to be permitted. See Hans Smit, Annulment and Recognition
of Annulled Awards, supra note 6.
28. See text at note 11 supra.
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present CPR rules relating to intra-arbitral review provide for the panel
to be composed of former federal judges. 29 However, this appears to be
too limited a category. But much can be said in favor of selecting
appellate arbitrators from groups of persons who have experience in
arbitration, possess significant special qualifications, and are appointed
by a neutral party. I would favor institutional initiatives toward forming
pools of prospective appellate arbitrators whose names and qualifications
are published and from which the institution will select a panel for each
particular case. The institution will select the appellate arbitrators on its
own. It may consult with the parties on the special qualities the parties
deem desirable, but the parties may not propose their own candidates.3 °
This method of selection will be likely to enhance confidence in the
appellate process.
The scope of the arbitral process review presents the second crucial
question. Various possible answers present themselves. Here again, the
institutional and ad hoc rules face a choice: They can provide their own
definition of the scope of review; they can provide their own definition
as a fall-back from the definition of the scope of review in the individual
arbitration agreement; or they can leave the scope of review to be
determined in the individual arbitration agreement. In the latter case,
they can offer the parties who provide for intra-arbitral review a number
of options.
In my opinion, the better arguments favor a single and exclusive
definition of the scope of review in the institutional or ad hoc rules. The
considered judgment of the drafters of institutional and ad hoc rules as to
the most desirable scope of review is likely to be better than ad hoc
determinations by drafters of contracts who are unlikely or unable to give
the question the consideration it deserves. Furthermore, a single
definition of the scope of review is likely to promote consistency in, and
foreseeability of the results of, its application by appellate tribunals,
especially if, as I would like to provide, appellate arbitral decisions will
be published as a matter of course.
However, if it is deemed preferable to permit the parties to choose
the scope they deem most appropriate, it will still be appropriate to
provide them with options as between possible scope definitions. I will
therefore discuss both a preferred scope of review and possible
alternatives.
The essential nature of arbitration as an efficient and flexible
substitute for litigation would be put in jeopardy if provisions were made
29. CPR Rules for Appellate Review, Rule 1.2.
30. List procedures are to be avoided, since they go in the direction of a party's
appointing its own-arbitrator.
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for plenary review on the facts and the law. An assigned error approach
such as that of the federal system would appear far preferable. If that
approach is adopted, the next question is whether both errors of fact and
errors of law are to be reviewable and what the standard of review is to
be. It may be regarded as desirable to adopt the standard of review
applied in federal appellate courts. The advantage of adopting that
standard is that there is a developed body of law on the application of
that standard. The clearly erroneous standard applied in reviewing
findings of fact would not permit de novo review of such findings, but
limit review to findings of fact that no reasonable arbitrator would make.
A similar limitation could be applied in reviewing findings of law.
Arbitrators have desirable leeway in developing and applying law to fit
the circumstances of the individual case and it would appear appropriate
to interfere with that freedom only when they have clearly strayed from
their appointed task.
Certainly, the manifest disregard of the law standard, probably
precluded for the courts by the Mattel case, should be considered as a
standard for arbitral appellate review. And manifest disregard of the
contract, introduced into at least some of the pre-Mattel court decisions,
should also be considered. Indeed, the clearly erroneous standard may
well come close to the manifest disregard standard, but would offer the
advantage of not necessarily importing the case law developed in regard
to the manifest disregard standard.31
An advantage of introducing a manifest disregard of the law or the
terms of the contract standard in arbitral rather than judicial review is
that it will avoid the problems caused when the disregard of the law
standard is used to annul an award in court. Under the New York
Convention, an award so annulled may nevertheless be recognized and
enforced. This uncertainty is eliminated when an award is reversed by
an appellate arbitral tribunal. That tribunal's award must be recognized
and enforced in all countries bound by the N.Y. Convention.
All in all, a standard of review that is limited to clearly erroneous
findings of fact or law appears to be the most appropriate in the
circumstances and to send a clear message to the appellate tribunal that it
should reverse only in limited circumstances.
If institutional or ad hoc rule makers were to wish to import more
flexibility into the system, they could provide for additional optional
standards of review. They could permit review of clearly erroneous
3 1. Appropriate provision must be made for the case in which an annulment or
recognition action is brought before intra-arbitral review is sought. The applicable
arbitration agreement or institutional or ad hoc rules should provide that the original
arbitral tribunal's award in that case should not be considered final. See text at note 33
supra.
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findings of law only and exclude review of the facts on the reverse. Or
they could permit review of clearly erroneous findings of fact only. And
they could permit review only if the decisions appealed from are clearly
unjust. Clearly, the possible variations are numerous.
The notion that arbitration is contractual and designed to meet the
desires of its customers argues for a great deal of flexibility. But a single
standard would promote predictability and a reasonable control of the
arbitral process so as to avoid its degenerating into a duplicate of
litigation.
If, as argued here, intra-appellate review under institutional and ad
hoc rules would be limited to clearly erroneous conclusions of fact or
law, parties might nevertheless provide for different kinds of review in
their arbitration agreements. The question then arises whether such
individual clauses would prevail over the relevant institutional or ad hoc
rules. If that were deemed undesirable, the institutional or ad hoc rules
should specifically exclude provision for a different scope of review.
That would result in the arbitral appellate procedure to become entirely
ad hoc with the consequence that the parties would have to regulate the
entire appellate process in their arbitration agreement.
a. The Particulars of the Appellate Arbitral Process
The permissible scope of review is only one of the elements of the
intra-arbitral process of review. The relevant rules or provisions in the
arbitration agreement must also deal with the time period within which
the appeal must be perfected, how is it to be perfected, how the appellate
tribunal is to be constituted, what the appellate procedure will be, what
decisions the appellate tribunal may render, whether it must render a
reasoned decision, and how its decision is to be communicated to the
parties. I will not address here all particulars to be worked out with
regard to these subjects, but highlight only the more important ones.
Since the constitution of the appellate tribunal is of particular
importance, I would argue that its members should not be appointed by
the parties, but by the supervising institution and, even in ad hoc
arbitration, by a competent third party, such as a leading arbitration
institution. This, I believe, will lead to more even-handed and consistent
decision-making. And, if, as I would advocate, the decisions of the
appellate tribunals would be published as a matter of course and not only
upon the consent of the parties, a significant step forward would be made
towards desirable transparency in arbitration.
The rules of procedure should also address the appellate tribunal's
authority to require adequate security for costs and ultimate recovery and
to suspend enforcement of the first-instance award.
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The task of the appellate tribunal must also be defined. Must the
appellate tribunal, in the case of reversal, remand the case or can it
finally adjudicate the controversy itself and, if necessary, receive
additional factual evidence? It is submitted that it is more in the spirit of
arbitration, as a self-contained efficient process, to permit the appellate
tribunal to dispose of the entire case itself and not to permit it to send the
case back to the original tribunal. In any event, the ICSID model of
having an appellate tribunal annul the original award and then to require
a de novo arbitration as a third stage deserves no emulation.32 Nor does,
by the way, the unusually narrow review permitted by the ICSID Rules
commend itself.
The ICSID example of not permitting judicial review by a domestic
tribunal should not be followed either. The final award by the appellate
tribunal should be subject to the usual review in municipal courts in
annulment and recognition and enforcement actions.
D. Contractual Provisions Relating to the Class Action
The notion that arbitration is a contractually created mode of dispute
resolution has give rise to efforts by those who use the process to
contractually turn it to their advantage. Not only have providers of mass
consumer products and services embraced arbitration as the preferred
mode of dispute settlement, they have also sought to limit their exposure
in the arbitral process. A significant advantage of arbitration is generally
that a jury is avoided. Prevailing institutional and ad hoc rules do not
provide for adjudication by a jury and, perhaps somewhat surprisingly,
there appears to be no arbitrated cases involving the use of a jury, nor of
contractual provisions precluding resort to a jury.
However, multiple users of arbitration have sought to use their
contractual freedom to mold the arbitral process to serve their interests
by other provisions. Now that it has been established that the class
action device is, in principle, available in arbitration, contractual
exclusions of recourse to class actions have made their appearance. And
so have contractual provisions excluding awards of consequential and
punitive damages. And, naturally, the appearance of such clauses have
raised the question of whether they are permissible and enforceable.
Not surprisingly, there appears to be no authority for the view that
class actions can be contractually excluded in normal litigation.
However, intrepid lawyers have definitely attempted to do so. In my
view, the class action reflects a judgment by the body politic as to how
32. On the recognition of annulled awards, see Smit, Annulment and Recognition of
Annulled Awards, note 6 supra.
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multiple claims with common characteristics can best be adjudicated.
That judgment is not, and should not be, subject to private manipulation.
Agreement to outlaw class actions in the courts are therefore
unenforceable as against public policy.
The same conclusion appears warranted in regard to preclusion of
class actions in arbitration if the consequence of such preclusion would
be to preclude class actions altogether. The qualification appears
appropriate, for, if preclusion of the class action in arbitration would lead
to the conclusion that claims otherwise subject to arbitration can still be
pursued in class actions in the courts, the class action avenue would
remain preserved. But, at least at present, it is uncertain whether the
courts would attach that consequence to contractual exclusion of the
class action in arbitration.
Since the U.S. Supreme Court in the Green Tree case, in accordance
with what I had previously argued, ruled that, in the absence of relevant
provisions in the arbitration agreement, it was for the arbitration to
decide whether a claimant could bring a class action,33 drafters of
institutional and ad hoc rules necessarily had to consider whether to
include in their rules provisions on class actions. The American
Arbitration Association has taken the lead in this regard and has adopted
the AAA Class Action Rules. They deserve more elaborate discussion
than would be appropriate here. But I would like to draw attention to
one of its major defects. The AAA Rules follow in large measure the
provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
provides for the court's certification of the class and the court's approval
of settlements. Under the AAA Rules, these functions are performed by
the arbitral tribunal.34 But since arbitral tribunals are normally composed
of arbitrators designated by the parties, as soon as the parties agree on the
proper class, and more importantly, on the settlement, the tribunal will
normally also agree. A crucial safeguard will thus be removed. Since it
will be difficult, if not impossible, to give the arbitral tribunal the
detachment and authority needed for the proper administration of class
actions, I would be inclined to argue that the administration of class
actions should remain reserved for the courts. Appropriate legislation
may be needed to accomplish this.
E. Exclusion of Consequential and Punitive Damages
Whether an award of consequential or punitive damages may be
contractually excluded is a question that arises in both ordinary litigation
33. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
34. AAA Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations, Rule 4(a).
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and arbitration. In my view, it should be answered the same way,
regardless of the forum in which it arises. And since the issue arises in
the context of defining contractual relations which, in principle, the
parties may fashion as they see fit, the parties should be free to exclude
whatever kinds of damages they wish. Of course, otherwise applicable
principled of contract law, such as mistake, fraud, duress,
unconscionability and the like should continue to be applicable, but a
straightforward outlawing of clauses precluding awards of consequential
or punitive damages would appear inappropriate.
F. The Unilateral or Optional Arbitration Clause
Increasingly used by providers of mass services or products is the
unilateral or optional arbitration clause. In its most frequently occurring
form, it gives one of the parties a choice between arbitration and
litigation. But the optional feature may be attached to other parts of the
contract. Thus, for example, more expansive review of the arbitral award
may be allowed to only one of the parties, exclusion of particular types
of damage clauses may benefit only one of the parties, and a choice of
law clause may be invoked by only one of the parties. As a general
principle, whatever benefit may be provided for in the arbitration
agreement may be sought to be extended to only one of the parties.
The courts have generally been inclined to uphold the validity of
such clauses, although unconscionability has appealed to some as ground
for invalidity. I am strongly of the view that such clauses have no place
in an evenhanded system of adjudication and should be held
unenforceable in all circumstances. I intend to attempt a more extensive
analysis of the unilateral arbitration clause and the potential grounds for
its invalidity in the near future. But since the fate of the clause has not
yet been authoritatively adjudicated, drafters of institutional and ad hoc
rules may be well advised to consider outlawing the use of such clauses
in arbitrations they administer by providing in their rules that any form of
unilateral or optional clause will be converted in an arbitration clause
without the optional or unilateral feature. A clause to this effect is
particularly desirable since, in its absence, a ruling that the unilateral or
optional clause is unenforceable may prompt an additional ruling that, in
the absence of a valid arbitration clause, the parties are relegated to
resolving their disputes in the courts.
II. CONCLUSIONS
Since arbitration is the product of the exercise of contractual
freedom, parties will naturally be inclined to make the process fit their
predilections. And, naturally, the economically stronger party will be
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most likely to use that freedom to their advantage. This essay is a first
attempt to explore the limits that the law does or should impose on that
freedom. It endorses as its basic premise that the parties' freedom should
be circumscribed when maintenance of arbitration as a socially
acceptable form of dispute resolution for both parties so requires

